Choice bits on the AMLO & the presidential election

Overall, today’s NYT Magazine story about the Lopez Obrador and the upcoming presidential election in Mexico is pretty good. I’m not sure that I entirely agree with the conclusion:

As the presidential campaign enters its final and critical phase, there is no longer any question of where this campaign is being fought: on the terrain of populism. The fact that Calderón has chosen to challenge López Obrador there, on what had always been AMLO’s home ground, is a testament to how much López Obrador’s campaign has changed Mexican politics. Of course, if López Obrador goes on to lose an election that, three months ago, most Mexicans thought he would win, that fact is not likely to be much of a consolation to him.

I say that I don’t entirely agree only because I’m uncomfortable with the emphasis on populism, especially given its recent association in the press with several South American leaders. Rather than try to categorize candidates or races, why not provide a better explanation of their positions? But, I guess it wouldn’t be as catchy without a way to group a whole range of candidates and positions together.

Luckily, in the rest of the article, the author tries to provide a more nuanced portrait of Lopez Obrador and his positions:

López Obrador himself scoffs at these fears. “Change is possible,” he told me when we spoke in April on the patio of his home in the gated community of Galaxia in Villahermosa, the capital of his native state of Tabasco. “Of course I understand that globalization is a fact and that one has to act within its parameters. But this does not mean that we here in Mexico have to continue as we have been doing. This country is immensely rich. Its problems are problems of maladministration — above all, of corruption.” And he added, “The point is that the Washington consensus” — as the neoliberal model of development is known — “was applied more rigidly here, by successive Mexican governments, than it ever was in the U.S. and Europe, where there are many protected sectors, above all agriculture.”

The passage above suggests that Lopez Obrador is critical of neoliberalism but also understands that a return to the economic policies of the 1970s (i.e., populist spending) would be unwise. Which is why it is surprising that the author would then go on to write this statement about AMLO:

In fact, he insists, the model has not worked, and he vows that if he is elected, he will pursue a very different set of policies, ones that serve the poor rather than the rich.

What I’ve read doesn’t suggest that AMLO will pursue a “very different set of policies.” Instead, it seems that he will keep many of the neoliberal reforms in place (i.e., keep free trade provisions, will not nationalize industries that were recently privatized, respect central bank policy, etc.), but what he has promised to change is spending on the poor. Granted, how he’ll pay for all that is a difficult, and unanswered, question.

This passage about migration also reflects a more subtle picture of AMLO, the candidate:

“If I am elected,” he told me, “I will propose a conference on migration with the United States. Building a wall is not a viable solution. The only thing that will work is creating jobs in Mexico. Fox was not able to maintain good relations with Washington. But I can’t see any reason why I can’t succeed in doing so.”

This accomodationist language toward the United States might seem surprising coming from the politician the Calderón campaign has tried to associate with Hugo Chávez, Fidel Castro’s greatest ally and the Latin American politician Washington fears most these days. But, in fact, it is consistent with the position López Obrador has taken throughout the campaign. His aides often point out that he has no quarrel with the United States, and in his campaign he reserves his scorn for the political and business establishment of Mexico. Although some American observers remain fearful of his leftist tendencies — The Wall Street Journal ran a column in March worrying that AMLO might be “laying the groundwork for an assault on the private sector” — none of the Americans I spoke to in Mexico seemed to believe that López Obrador will nationalize oil and gas resources, as Evo Morales has done and Hugo Chávez has threatened to do.

Update: After poking around the blogosphere some more, I find that Greg had a similar reaction to the article. The article is inconsistent–perhaps the effects of an editor trying to spice it up?

First two paragraphs of my book manuscript

In the first half of the twentieth century, the most economically advanced Latin American countries established extensive welfare institutions for government and industrial workers, only to begin the process of dismantling some of those institutions, notably pensions, in the last two decades of the century. Social insurance, including extensive pension, health, and worker’s compensation programs, protected formal sector workers, or those in the regulated labor market, in the majority of Latin American countries by mid-century. These welfare institutions were often central to the fabric of political life. The debt crisis of the 1980s ushered in a new economic orthodoxy and efforts in most countries to substantially reform social insurance institutions, though with varying success. The reform or privatization of public pensions was the most notable of this trend, though public health insurance was also targeted for reform. Given their political importance, the reform of these welfare institutions was (and is, where reform efforts are on-going) highly contentious. Despite the centrality of these welfare institutions to Latin American politics, few studies have systematically examined their political origins and historical development. This lacuna is conspicuous when compared to the extensive comparative literature on similar welfare institutions in the advanced industrialized economies of Western Europe and North America. This book begins to bridge this gap in our understanding of the dynamics of welfare in Latin America through a comparative historical analysis of social insurance institutions in Mexico since the Mexican Revolution.

The study of welfare in Mexico provides a good opportunity to deepen our understanding of the politics of welfare in Latin America because Mexico suggests a number of interesting theoretical puzzles. For instance, why would a country that was predominantly agrarian in the 1940s opt to invest considerable political and economic resources into welfare institutions that benefited a small, but growing, number of primarily urban, industrial workers? If the creation and expansion of welfare in Europe is associated with the expansion of suffrage to workers and the consolidation of democracy at the turn of the twentieth century, why were welfare institutions created during the consolidation of authoritarianism in Mexico? And, if organized labor was so co-opted and weak during the height of Mexican authoritarianism in the 1950s through 1970s, why was this the period of greatest expansion of welfare coverage and benefits? And more recently, if the regime that dominated Mexican politics for the majority of the twentieth century had so completely established control of organized labor, why was the regime unable to impose all the pension and health insurance reforms it favored during the 1990s? The answers to these questions, I argue, can be found in the relationship between organized labor and the state and in the processes of institutional change. My explanation is not one that stresses Mexican exceptionalism, though Mexican history does reveal certain particularities. Because my explanation is theoretically grounded in the literatures on welfare and institutional change, it emphasizes the theoretical affinities between the Mexican experience and those in other countries that have faced the incorporation of an organized working class into national politics.

The AMLO the U.S. press won’t be covering

Because of course, they like to paint him as a Chaves (Venezuela) or Morales (Bolivia) figure, when he’s probably more like a Lula (Brazil), at least when it comes to the economy. In recent campaign appearances, he’s tried to reassure voters (and investors) that he won’t destabilize the economy:

“Las reservas de divisas del Banco de México las tienen que manejar el gobernador y los técnicos financieros de la institución. Para que quede claro: la política económica que vamos a manejar va a guiarse con criterios técnicos, no ideológicos”, dijo el candidato presidencial de la coalición Por el Bien de Todos, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, antes de iniciar el primero de sus cuatro mítines este día por Jalisco, en su séptima y penúltima gira de campaña por la entidad.

I think this statement is consistent with his past behavior, especially during the desafuero (also). And, with no re-election, an AMLO in office would have little incentive to use outrageous populist spending–the best legacy would be stable economic growth, and I suspect that AMLO knows that.

Don’t know if it’s fair, but it’s certainly not balanced

Today, La Jornada is running a story that tries to besmirch Calderon’s reputation. During his tenure as President of the PAN, the party ran television ads to convince people that FOBAPROA would effectively rescue the banking system. FOBAPROA was a banking bailout that has been highly criticized for compensating the rich for risky investment and banking behavior. It is highly unpopular. During Calderon’s tenure as party President, the party asked for 5 million pesos reimbursement from the government for the FOBAPROA ads. And the leftist La Jornada is now reminding voters of that.

And I thought political methodologists could be persnickity…

At least I haven’t heard of any of them threatening violence.

The following are excerpts from the editor’s report for Sociological Methodology (scroll down to SM):

Your editor reports a year of drama and success in preparation of his final volume of Sociological Methodology….

This has been a year punctuated by drama. Your editor seems to have encountered once again a small, previously unrecognized, nascent social movement that he calls the Thin-Skinned Scholar Movement (TSSM). TSSM serves the needs of scholars who object to publication of opinions that contradict their own. Your editor believes that the goals of TSSM are misguided, as his own professional fortunes have been advanced by the publication of debates about his own research. More important, disagreement is fundamental to scholarship, making the suppression of disagreements a fundamental violation of the purpose for which Sociological Methodology is published….

Your editor is deeply distressed by the style of the TSSM. In particular, consider the following incident: Several weeks ago, I encountered a thin-skinned scholar, who was driving in his car as I walked to my own car in a parking lot. Apparently unimpressed by the writings of Miss Manners, this scholar opened his car window, loudly and repeatedly declared strong views about the composition of my head and the phylum in which I should be classified, and rapidly drove his car so close to me that it did, on the third such maneuver, brush against my pants. I wonder still, is this thin-skinned scholar just a talented and kind-hearted stunt-driver with unusual ideas about parking? Or does he reveal true malice, a will to evoke fear and a willingness to use his car to damage a pedestrian? These are questions that I cannot answer. But answers are suggested by his emailed statement (with copies to others) that he would be pleased to see my body lifeless and in pieces. More to the point, these are questions that no editor should have to consider. This thinskinned scholar has wasted great volumes of an editor’s time and effort, reviled the editor in numerous hostile email letters (with copies sent to a variety of others), delayed publication of Sociological Methodology, wasted hours of time by talented and highly-paid lawyers, and badly strained relations between an editor who sought to uphold the principles under which scholarly journals are published, and the ASA executive officer, who sought to save the ASA the expense and trouble of a lawsuit by an enraged scholar.

This makes those Lodge and Russo books seem less like fiction.
Via Freakonomics, where Levitt asks readers to publicly out who the culprit may be. [The editor is on the faculty at Chicago.]

University email etiquette with students

Miss Manners has suggested that students address their emails to Professor X or Dr. X, even when the professor signs “Firstname.”

I usually use the strategy used by Chris. I sign “md” with my signature below, with the following exceptions–if an undergraduate student sends me an email with a salutation “Hey” or “Miss Dion” or the dreaded “Mrs. Dion” OR if a graduate student sends me an overly formal email with “Dear Dr. Michelle Dion” (yes, this happens). In the former case, I sign my reply “Dr. Michelle Dion,” with the signature and in the latter, I sign “Michelle” with the signature. I’m hoping to correct overly informal and overly formal tendencies in favor of some middle ground. [In my department, several faculty members expect even graduate students to address them as Dr., so I also have to be careful not to deviate too much from that norm.]

Unlike Margaret, I am annoyed when I get a “hey” email. I also work in an engineering institution with too many young male students who seem to refer to my male colleagues as “Dr. Whoknowseverything” and my female colleagues as “Miss Whatwasyournameagain.”

While I’m personally not real picky with how students address me as long as they are respectful (which in my case has seldom been a problem–I’m a commanding 5’1″), I am sensitive to the pervasive gender biases among our students. To make a point to them, I address the problem directly, often with humor. By the end of the semester, students always get the gender pronoun right when we discuss different authors of the articles we read, so I feel justified in my little bit of consciousness raising. And no one has ever complained about it on my evaluations either.

Happy Anniversary to us!

Brian and I have been married 8 years today. We have been a couple a total of 13 years. We have known each other almost 23 years. And we’re still best friends–quite an accomplishment, I’d say.


After a White Sox game in April.

PRI moves to expel party leaders

The PRI plans to expel party leaders who have suggested voters should vote for either AMLO or Calderon. Among those to be expelled are Senator Bartlett (for supporting AMLO), Senator Borrego (former head of IMSS, President of the party, and wanna-be presidential candidate in 94–for supporting Calderon), and Gordillo (former #2 at the party and head of the teacher’s union–for….being Gordillo?). (Bloomberg version.)

More on the polls and why some on the street think that Madrazo is behind.

Mexican stump speeches

Of course, La Jornada doesn’t cover Calderon’s stump speeches (which I’m assuming he does make–it can’t all be slick tv ads, which BTW, continue to be pulled for being too negative), but it does cover those by the PRI’s Madrazo and the PRD’s Lopez Obrador. Recently, Madrazo has said that he has no role in the decision of some party leaders to suggest that supporters of the PRI vote for AMLO rather than Madrazo (this was something a recent commenter asked about). Almost as if in response, AMLO has said the door to his campaign is open to all but former president Salinas and a few other folks.

Here, on the other side, WaPo (thanks, Boz) Rueters is doing its share to damage AMLO’s North American image.

Mexican poll results

This short article has results from the last three Reforma polls.

It’s still a two-way race between AMLO and Calderon. ALMO is gaining some–probably due to a variety of factors:

1. The electoral commission told Calderon’s campaign to stop running certain negative ads against AMLO.

2. AMLO’s campaign has started running tougher ads in addition to AMLO’s traditional radio spots and interviews.

3. Some time has passed since the first debates, in which AMLO did not participate and Calderon was able to use that to his advantage. It was just after the debate that Calderon pulled into the lead for the first time.

Another debate is scheduled for June 6, and all candidates will be participating.

How about just updating the petite section?

Apparently, several high-end department stores are eliminating their petite sections on the grounds that they don’t make money. At the sametime, overall sales of petites have increased by 11%, according to the Times article. I can tell the department stores the problem: their petite sections are outdated and unfashionable. The reporter for the Times is correct when he says:

What did change is that petite departments gained a reputation for traditional — some would say frumpy — career-oriented clothing. Chic looks, clothing executives said, never made the leap from regular sizes to petite. So the very word petite became synonymous with many women who shopped there — working women over the age 50.

As a vertically challenged individual (I almost measure 5’1″ if I stretch my neck), I buy all my suits in the petite section but never my casual clothes. The casual clothes are all ugly sweaters with sewn-on appliques and rhinestones–the over 60 stuff. The only jeans are mom jeans, and the khakis are what Brian likes to call “peg-legged.”

The Gap, Banana Republic, Talbots, and Ann Taylor have all expanded their petite sections recently, which probably has hurt department store petite sales. Why would anyone buy high-waisted, peg-leg khakis when you can get hip-hugging, flare khakis in your size? Of course, the drawback is that most stores don’t care all the petite options in the store, which means short vertically challenged women have to do their shopping online.

Oh, and I’d just like to point out that adding additional size 0 and 1 items in stores, as suggested by one of the people interviewed, will not meet the needs of most petite women….we may be short, but we’re not all skinny!